Educational television for young children often combines factual content with fantasy. In 2 experiments, we examined 3-to 5-year-olds' reality judgments and the implications for their learning. In the 1st study, 145 children watched 3 clips featuring (respectively) a Hispanic, a Chinese American, and an Anglo character. Responses indicated age differences in character-reality judgments (e.g., "X can hear me"), acceptance of fantasy (e.g., talking backpacks), rejection of factual content (i.e., Spanish and Chinese words are "just pretend") but not perceived learning. Perceived reality of Chinese and Spanish words used by the characters partially mediated age differences in word comprehension, controlling for viewer ethnicity. In the 2nd study, 114 children were randomly assigned to see clips featuring either Hispanic or Chinese traditions and words. Age differences in reality judgments were replicated and were partially mediated by children's use of evidence or arguments to justify reality judgments and (to a lesser extent) by their cognitive flexibility. Further, children's reality judgments partially mediated age differences in learning of the educational content. Results suggest that reality distinctions improve with age, contributing to children's learning.
Consider a 4-year-old who watches a popular television program featuring a Latina character. On the show, the character uses some Spanish words intermingled with English and partakes in various celebrations related to her ethnicity, such as a cousin's quinceañera, or Three Kings' Day. However, the character and her surroundings are animated rather than live action, leaving the physical cues of her ethnicity and location subject to the judgments of the illustrators. She interacts with a singing map, a talking backpack, and a fox who tries to steal her belongings. What might the viewer, within the target age group for this show, conclude about Hispanics?
This question lies at the intersection of several lines of research. One focuses on early learning and theorizing about social categories such as ethnicity. A second examines children's developing ability to distinguish fantasy and reality. A third, related line looks at beliefs about the nature of television viewing.
In two studies, we examined 3-to 5-year-olds' judgments about TV content featuring various ethnic groups. Study 1 focused on their perceptions of what was real and what was "pretend" in programs featuring (respectively) a Hispanic, a Chinese American, and an Anglo protagonist. In Study 2, we attempted to replicate age differences, evaluate explanations for age differences, and examine the relationships between realism judgments and learning of cultural content.
Complicated Depictions and Developing Understanding of Ethnicity
We focused on children's responses to depictions of Hispanics and Chinese Americans. Both are sizable ethnic groups in the United States and are understudied with regard to children's knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes about them. We acknowledge that Asians are considered a multiethnic racial group and Hispanics a multiracial ethnic group, but because our emphasis is on cultural material, we use the term ethnicity with its connotations of learned differences.
Examination of educational TV programs for young viewers (produced in the United States and aired internationally) indicates that our opening description of Dora the Explorer is typical of other depictions of Hispanics and Chinese Americans (e.g., Go, Diego, Go!; Handy Manny;, and Ni Hao, Kai Lan) . Such programs sporadically offer information about Chinese or Hispanic culture, make references to relevant countries and places, and present Spanish or Chinese words. However, all but one (Sesame Street) are animated rather than live action. As is typical in educational shows for this age group (Mares & Acosta, 2008) , the characters interact with anthropomorphic creatures: talking animals (Ni, Hao, Kai Lan; Go, Diego, Go!) , talking tools (Handy Manny), a magic rocket ship (Little Einsteins), or a Hispanic Muppet (Sesame Street).
What background knowledge might young viewers bring to bear upon such depictions? Comprehension of references to other countries, for example, requires both factual information (names, relative locations) and knowledge of hierarchical relationships (e.g., towns are within countries). Piaget and Weil (1951) interviewed Swiss children and concluded that the majority of those under the age of 5 years had no concept of country; 5-to 8-year-olds knew the name of their country but had difficulty representing their town as existing within their country. More recently, Barrett (2007) reported that children across Europe showed simple knowledge of their own country's geography at age 5 but knowledge of foreign countries only developed around age 8.
Similarly, understanding the cultural significance of characters shifting from one language to another requires information about what languages are spoken where and by whom, as well as an understanding of what drives linguistic differences. Barrett and Short (1992) found that most of the British 5-to 7-year-olds in their sample could not identify the languages spoken in France, Germany, Spain, or Italy, giving (unspecified) wrong answers. Moreover, children's theorizing about linguistic difference appears to be a work in progress over the course of the preschool years. Hirschfeld and Gelman (1997) found that U.S. 3-to 5-year-olds, like college students, thought that phrases in an unfamiliar language (Portuguese) were uttered by people depicted in unfamiliar rather than familiar clothing or housing or by Blacks rather than by Whites. However, 3-year-olds also picked pictures of adults facing backward as the Portuguese speakers and adults facing forward as the English speakers, suggesting confusion over what forms of novelty are relevant to linguistic difference.
Finally, for children to understand that characters represent a specific ethnic and cultural heritage requires at least rudimentary knowledge of those categories. Lam, Guerrero, Damree, and Enesco (2011) studied White, Black, and Asian 3-to 5-year olds in London and reported that younger children and those less cognitively developed were less likely to know racial labels and to use racial categories in sorting photos of children (see also Kowalski & Lo, 2001) .
In sum, young viewers probably lack knowledge relevant to televised depictions of other cultures. How do they distinguish the realistic content (e.g., it is a tradition to give money in red envelopes on Chinese New Year) from the surrounding fantasy (e.g., a monkey gets money too)?
Developing Understanding of Fantasy-Reality Distinctions
The accumulation of evidence suggests that children age 5 and younger regularly distinguish between fantasy and reality but also that they make mistakes. In a recent review, Woolley and Ghossainey (2013) noted that although most attention has focused on children's erroneous credulity (e.g., believing in magical or impossible events), there is also considerable evidence of erroneous skepticism (e.g., not believing that unfamiliar events can actually occur).
For example, Woolley and Cox (2007) asked 3-to 5-year-olds about events and characters in fantasy, realistic, or religious stories. Across the three story types, 37% of 3-year-olds erroneously said that the main character was a real person or could come play with them, compared with 21% of 4-year-olds and 15% of 5-year olds. The more prevalent error, though, was undue skepticism: 72% of 3-year-olds, 62% of 4-year olds, and 42% of 5-year-olds said the focal events in realistic stories (e.g., a boy learning to dance) could not possibly happen, and more than half of the children denied that someone like the main character could exist in real life. Relatedly, Tullos and Woolley (2009) found that 4-yearolds displayed a skepticism bias when judging the reality of novel entities and were less able than 6-or 8-year-olds to use evidence of the creatures' existence to inform their judgments (see also Woolley & Van Reet, 2006) .
What explains these patterns? Woolley and Ghossainy (2013) argued that young children's limited cognitive resources and lack of awareness about the inadequacy of their personal experience and knowledge lead them to overestimate the significance of unfamiliarity and, hence, to deny the reality of novel events or objects. They tend not to modify their default skepticism on the basis of further information, in part because of the effort involved (unless evidence of reality is culturally pervasive as with Santa or the tooth fairy). Relatedly, Shtulman and Carey (2007) noted that (unlike older children) 4-year-olds lacked principled reasons for saying something was impossible, justifying their claims with redundant statements ("It's impossible") or hypothetical statements that did not address possibility ("You'd hit your head"). The authors suggested that in the absence of principled reasons, young children rely on the simple strategy of denying the possibility of surprising or unfamiliar events and (conversely) are vulnerable to persuasion that magical events may occur.
Consistent with these arguments that young children lack cognitive resources for sophisticated evaluations of reality, some research suggests that they rely on overly simplistic heuristics about context to judge the utility of information. Richert and her colleagues presented 3-to 5-year olds with solutions to problems, either in fantasy or realistic stories (Richert, Robb, & Smith, 2011; Richert & Smith, 2011) . Across five experiments, children were less likely to use a solution in an analogous situation if they heard about it in a fantasy story rather than a realistic story. Presenting the stories to the class in "circle time" did not increase use of strategies presented in fantasy stories, despite Richert and Smith's (2011) hypothesis that doing so might signal the educational nature of the content. Thus, as Richert and Smith (2011, p. 1106 ) put it, 3-to 5-year olds erroneously "quarantine" useful content in the presence of narrative cues signaling lack of reality.
Children's Judgments About Television Reality
Thus far, research on children's fantasy-reality judgments has examined their responses to pictures, sentences, brief vignettes, or (more rarely) whole picture books. It is also worth considering how children evaluate TV and other sources of video. Anderson and Hanson (2010) argued that processing screen media content is a demanding cognitive activity that requires special forms of attention, perception, and comprehension. As we review in this article, children form theories and learn about the nature of video at the same time as they learn about fantasy and reality. Barr, Muentener, and Garcia (2007) proposed three phases in children's early understanding of the relationship between television and the external world. In the first phase (roughly ages 5-12 months) infants treat two-dimensional (2D) images (whether pictures or TV) in the same way that they do 3D objects, reaching out This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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to grab the depicted objects. In the second phase, they are hypothesized to have learned that 2D video images do not have the same affordances as 3D objects (e.g., cannot be picked up, dropped, or tasted) but not to understand that these images are representations that can have relevance to the real world. Consistent with this finding, research indicates that 1-to 2½-year-olds are much less likely to learn actions and words presented on-screen than in live interactions (Anderson & Hanson, 2010; Anderson & Pempek, 2005) . Finally, at around age 3, children are thought to achieve dual representation, understanding both that televisions (or other screens) are objects separate from the images being shown but also that video content can represent reality. Consistent with this, 3-to 5-year-olds tend to learn words, object locations, and simple action sequences from screen depictions as well as from live interactions. Despite the fading of the video deficit for word and action learning by the end of the second year, other research suggests that children's knowledge of the relationship between TV and the real world is still immature. Nikken and Peeters (1988) reported that 20% of 4-to 9-year olds said that characters on Sesame Street could hear and see them. Similarly, Flavell, Flavell, Green, and Korfmacher (1990) reported that 3-year-olds (and to a lesser extent, 4-year-olds) said that objects depicted on-screen (e.g., a bowl of popcorn) would spill if the TV were tipped over and that people shown on-screen could hear the viewers. What do such responses mean? On the one hand, Flavell et al. (1990) argued that such responses merely reflected 3-year-olds' difficulty focusing on the affordances of TV images rather than the affordances of the real-world objects; on the other hand, young viewers often respond to TV character prompts (Anderson et al., 2000; Calvert, Strong, Jacobs, & Conger, 2007) in a manner consistent with beliefs that the character can see and hear them.
Other studies, using other types of questions, also revealed signs of TV reality confusions. Hawkins (1977) reported that preschool and kindergarten children, in contrast to first and third graders, tended to say that characters on fictional programs such as The Waltons continued their lives as depicted (e.g., together as a family) even after each episode was over. Wright, Huston, Reitz, and Piemyat (1994) asked 5-and 7-year olds whether the characters on their favorite show rehearsed what they said or did before going on TV, performed their depicted job in real life, and could help viewers with problems as depicted on the show. The 5-yearolds were significantly more likely to say that their favorite show was not rehearsed and were marginally more likely to say the characters held their job in real life, but even 7-year-olds showed substantial error rates. Thus, beyond the video deficit phase, children still struggle with reality judgments, ascribing excessive reality to the lives of fictional characters.
Believing that characters have ongoing lives (perhaps inside the TV) does not necessarily mean that those lives are considered informative or representative of life outside of TV. Hawkins (1977) reported that although preschool and kindergarten children scored higher than first or third graders on character reality beliefs, they gave lower ratings of the realism and educational utility of television depictions (e.g., "Families on TV shows are like families in real life"; "TV shows about families help me know how to behave at home"). Similarly, Wright et al. (1994) found that 5-year-olds were more likely than 7-year-olds to say that events depicted in a series of clips, including news, were "just on TV, not in real life," and were not like people or events "around here." They were also more likely to misunderstand the goal of news and documentaries, saying that such clips were "just for fun" rather than for learning (see also Dorr, 1983) . Wright et al. (1994) considered two possible explanations for these age differences-the amount of viewing experience and cognitive development. In fact, prior viewing did little to predict the accuracy of children's realism judgments. Age and (to a lesser extent) vocabulary were the primary predictors of judgments, suggesting the centrality of cognitive processes. The authors concluded that children gradually form schemata for familiar program types (e.g., cartoons, Sesame Street, news) and that the cues for distinguishing these genres are learned prior to understanding the implications for reality. In the absence of such understanding, the default is to be skeptical of TV realism, while granting credence to characters' reality.
In sum, children's theorizing about video develops in parallel to their general fantasy-reality judgments, with elements that are unique to the medium. The fantasy-reality and TV reality literatures together suggest a variety of outcomes to be examinedcharacter and fantasy reality, content realism, viewer responses to character prompts, and knowledge of the educational goals of the program. Although it makes sense that these would all be intertwined, no prior research has examined them together or examined the trajectory of these judgments over the preschool years. Further, no research with preschool-aged audiences has examined how these judgments and behaviors are related to learning of the content.
The Current Studies
In two studies, 3-to 5-year olds watched clips from educational TV narratives. We assessed their reality/realism judgments and learning to examine three core research questions.
Developmental Trajectories of Reality Judgments
In a small longitudinal study of three children from ages 2 to 5, Jaglom and Gardner (1981) reported that children first ascribed physical reality to TV images, then went to the opposite extreme of denying the reality of any content. There is little other evidence about the trajectory of these judgments within the preschool age range. Thus, a primary research question of both studies concerned age differences in judgments.
What Might Explain Age Differences in Reality Judgments?
We considered two possible explanations-the acquisition of relevant experience (with TV and with the depicted content) and the acquisition of relevant cognitive skills. In Studies 1 and 2, we considered whether prior exposure to the programs would predict more accurate reality judgments. In doing so, we were extending the work of Wright et al. (1994) . They found little indication with 5-and 7-year olds that prior viewing predicted reality judgments, but it is possible that effects would be observed among younger children who have less accumulated experience. Further, we examined whether belonging to the depicted ethnic group (Study 1) or prior contact with the depicted ethnic group (Study 2) would improve reality judgments. Despite the intuitive appeal of this This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
prediction, research support is scant. In a study by Wright et al. (1995) , 7-and 10-year olds were expected to have less TV-biased schemas about the characteristics of nurses and policemen if they knew some in real life, but there was no such effect. Greenberg and Reeves (1976) found that 8-to 12-year olds judged stereotyped TV depictions of African Americans to be more realistic (rather than less) if they had real world contact with African Americans. Given these findings, and given that children under 5 tend not to use evidence to inform their reality judgments (e.g., Woolley & Van Reet, 2006) , it seems possible that contact with, or even membership in, the depicted ethnic group might not alter judgments or alter only those of older children.
In Study 2, we also examined possible cognitive explanations. Based on Woolley and Ghossainy's (2013) argument that young children's skepticism bias reflects overreliance on unfamiliarity, we coded children's open-ended answers for rejection of content based on lack of familiarity (e.g., "I've never heard people use those words"). Conversely, based on Shtulman and Carey's (2007) work, we coded whether children gave arguments or evidence to support judgments of realism (e.g., "Spanish teachers speak Spanish, so other people do too."). Of course, age differences in open-ended responses can reflect multiple sources of development (experience, reasoning, verbal ability), but the question was whether specific forms of reasoning explained age differences in reality judgments. Finally, we also examined whether cognitive flexibility (multiple classification skills) helped explain age differences. This variable has been argued to reflect basic cognitive development and was found to predict racial classification accuracy (Lam et al., 2011) and less biased processing of race-related content (Bigler & Liben, 1993) .
Relationships Between Reality Judgments and Learning
The third focal research question concerned the relationships between reality judgments and learning. Anderson and Collins (1988) argued that if children dismiss educational content as unrealistic, they may learn it but not incorporate it into their knowledge base about the real world, rendering that material "academically useless" (p. 41). Alternately, Huston, Wright, Fitch, Wroblewski, and Piemyat (1997) hypothesized that if children categorize content as pretend, they may invest less effort into processing it and hence not learn it as well as they would if they thought it was realistic.
There is some evidence with elementary-school-age children for both patterns. Consistent with the former, Huston et al. (1997) reported that second-and fifth-grade children incorporated more information from documentary clips than from fictional clips in their answers about what real world caterers and movie directors do, even though both sets of information were, in fact, equally accurate. Use of information from the fictional segments was predicted, in part, by perceptions of how realistic those segments were. Consistent with the latter, Huston et al. (1995) reported that third-and fourth-grade children remembered more of characters' emotions if they thought the content was factual (e.g., happened to a real family) and more actions and events if they thought the material realistic (e.g., characters were like people they knew in real life).
What about the implications of believing that characters can see and hear audience members? One intriguing possibility is that such beliefs may foster learning. Calvert et al. (2007) reported that children who responded to Dora's questions while watching Dora the Explorer showed greater learning. However, they did not examine whether beliefs about the character's reality mediated this effect.
As noted earlier, educational programming for preschool audiences is almost all animated rather than live action, and fantasy elements are ubiquitous. Given that the findings of Wright et al. (1994) that children first learn "cartoons" as a genre and that this genre is considered entertainment, young viewers' reality judgments seem potentially fraught. The current studies examine children's reality judgments about animated educational programs and the implications of those judgments for children's learning. In Study 1, we examined whether perceived reality of Chinese and Spanish words used in the clips mediated age differences in comprehension of these words. In Study 2, we assessed learning across more outcomes and examined whether reality judgments and interaction with the character mediated age differences in content learning.
Study 1
In addition to the core questions we have outlined, in Study 1 we examined whether the prevalence of fantasy within a clip would affect reality judgments. Children were randomly assigned to see either clips that focused on realistic interactions with human relatives or clips that focused on magical interactions with anthropomorphic characters. Given the prevalence of fantasy in educational programs and the centrality of the nonhuman characters in the programs used, all clips featured at least some fantasy interactions, but the duration of these interactions varied.
Method
Participants. A total of 145 children participated: 50 were 3 years old, 57 were 4, and 38 were 5 (age M ϭ 3.92, SD ϭ .78); 68 were girls (46.9%). Parental consent forms indicated there were 98 Anglo, 27 Chinese or Chinese American, and 20 Hispanic participants. Hispanic participants were significantly older (M ϭ 4.50, SD ϭ .61) than Anglo participants (M ϭ 3.80, SD ϭ .75), F(2, 142) ϭ 7.73, p Ͻ .01, reflecting younger Hispanic children's difficulty completing the study in English.
Design. This was a 3 (3-vs. 4-vs. 5-year olds) ϫ 3 (program with Anglo vs. Hispanic vs. Chinese protagonist) ϫ 2 (familyfocused vs. fantasy-focused clip) design. All children saw one clip from each program and were randomly assigned to see either family-focused or fantasy-focused clips.
Procedure. Clips were shown in randomized order on a laptop computer. Each clip was followed by questions. Sessions took approximately 35 min.
Materials. Each child saw three 4-min clips: one from Dora the Explorer featuring a Hispanic character; one from Ni Hao, Kai Lan featuring a Chinese American character, and one from Franny's Feet featuring an Anglo character. All three were cartoons rated E/I (educational and informational), meaning that they were intended to have educational content. Each featured a young female protagonist who interacted with anthropomorphic characters This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
and addressed the audience directly. In each clip, the opening song was left intact, followed by a segment ranging in length from 2 min 45 s to 2 min 50 s. For external validity, clips in both conditions contained interactions with relatives and nonhuman characters, but the proportions differed. In family-focused clips, an average of 51% of the time was spent with a relative, 23% with nonhumans, and 26% was spent alone. In fantasy-focused clips, 17% was spent with a relative, 57% with nonhumans, and 26% was spent alone.
Measures. For reality/realism questions, the response options (in randomized order) were "no" (depicted on screen by a red X, coded Ϫ1), "yes" (green check mark, coded ϩ1) and "not sure" (black question mark, coded 0). The interviewer read them out and pointed to each in turn.
Character reality. Children were asked (a) "If you're watching X on TV, and then the show is over, and you turn off the TV, is she still in there doing things while you're not watching?" and (b) "When she asks you a question, if you call out the answer, can she hear you?" Thus, across the three clips, there were six items that were averaged.
Fantasy reality. Children were asked one question per clip, "Do you think there are real places, outside TV, where . . . kids can have a talking backpack like Dora? . . . animals can talk like in Kai Lan? . . . kids can put on special shoes and then be in a different place like Franny?"
Comprehension and reality of Spanish and Chinese words. Children were asked (a) "When Dora (Kai Lan) says "Vámonos" ("Ni Hao"), what does she mean?" (b) "Great! Do you know other things she says like that-not in English?" (c) "Do you think she's using real words that real people use outside TV, or are they just made-up words for the show?" After a pause for a spontaneous response, the interviewer continued, "Do you think, yes, they're real; no, they're not real, or you're not sure?" (d) Those who did not say the words were real were asked, "Sometimes Dora (Kai Lan) says she's speaking Spanish (Chinese). Is that a real language that people use outside TV, or is it just made up for the show?" (same response options as for 3).
Word comprehension could range from 0 to 2: 1 point for the target word and another for an additional word volunteered. For language reality, children scored 1 if they said that the language was real in response to the first question, 0 if they chose "not sure" to either question or were inconsistent, and Ϫ1 if they answered both questions by saying the words were made up.
Perceived learning. Children were asked, ""Do you think you learn about other places by watching X?-no (0); yes, a little (1); or yes, a lot (2)."
Prior and related media exposure. Children were shown pictures and asked, "Have you ever seen . . . Dora the Explorer; Go, Diego, Go!; Handy Manny; Little Einsteins; and Ni Hao, Kai Lan?" If response was yes: once or twice (1) or more than once or twice (2).
Results
Preliminary analyses. Initial analyses showed no main or interaction effects of experimental condition (family-focused vs. fantasy-focused clips). Given this, and given that the two conditions contained the same characters albeit for different amounts of time, we combined the two conditions. In addition, repeatedmeasures analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) revealed no significant differences among the three programs for any of the outcomes, and there were no interactions between program and the child's own ethnicity. Given this, we averaged responses to the three clips, strengthening the measures and simplifying the analyses.
Relationships between reality judgments. Table 1 shows correlations between the reality measures. Character and fantasy reality scores were positively correlated and (ironically) were positively correlated with perceived learning about other places. However, fantasy reality ratings were negatively correlated with word-reality ratings, suggesting that responses did not simply reflect "yay-saying."
Predictors of reality judgments. We performed five regression analyses predicting reality judgments, summarized in Table 2 . On the first step, we entered dummy codes for the child's ethnicity, prior exposure to the three programs viewed in the experiment, and prior exposure to other programs featuring Hispanic and Chinese characters. On the second step, we entered the child's age in years (too few parents answered the question about birth month for us to use age in months). We initially included gender (given female This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
characters), but it was consistently nonsignificant and was dropped.
As can be seen from Table 2 , children's ethnicity was not a significant predictor of any of the reality judgments, including reality of Chinese or Spanish words. Prior exposure to the programs did not significantly predict reality judgments, but prior exposure to other programs featuring Hispanic or Chinese characters did. Those who watched such programs more often were more likely to say that they learned about other places from watching the experimental clips, but they also scored significantly higher on character-reality items ("X hears me"; "X is still doing things after show is over"). Thus, exposure was not positively associated with accuracy.
Age was a significant predictor of four of the five reality judgments, such that older children made more accurate judgments. Younger children (relative to older children) were more likely to endorse character reality and to say that fantasy elements (e.g., talking backpacks) were real. Conversely, older children (relative to younger children) were more likely to say that Spanish and Chinese words were real. There were no age differences in perceived learning about other places. Prior exposure to programs did not interact with age to predict reality judgments.
To explicate these age patterns, we examined the distributions of responses for each measure, as shown in Table 3 . We averaged the percentage within each age group responding "not real" for each item of a measure (e.g., for the six character-reality items), the percentage responding "not sure," and the percentage responding "real." Chi-square analyses were used to examine whether these distributions differed significantly from chance.
For character-reality items (e.g., "Can Dora hear you?"), children were split between "yes" and "no" responses, with 3-and 4-year olds leaning somewhat toward "yes" and 5-year-olds leaning more toward "no." For fantasy-reality items (e.g., "Are there really flying shoes?"), the majority of children at all three ages chose "no," but more than a third of both 3-and 4-year-olds said "yes." For both outcomes, response distributions differed significantly from chance for all three age groups.
Spanish and Chinese word-reality judgments were combined, given the lack of program and ethnic differences. There were higher frequencies of "not sure" responses for these judgments (compared with those for fantasy or character reality). The 3-yearolds tended to say that the words were not real or that they were not sure; the 4-year-olds' responses did not differ from chance distribution. Only among 5-year-olds did a majority say the words were real.
Spanish and Chinese word comprehension. To examine predictors of comprehension of Spanish and Chinese words, we performed the same regression analyses as we did for reality judgments. As shown in Table 2 , there were significant effects of age on comprehension, even after controls for the child's ethnicity and prior TV exposure.
Reality judgments and word comprehension. To examine whether age differences in word comprehension were mediated by perceived word reality, we used the Preacher and Hayes (2008) SPSS Indirect Macro. Age was the predictor, average rating of Spanish and Chinese reality was the mediator, and average comprehension of Spanish and Chinese words was the outcome. We controlled for ethnicity and prior exposure to the programs. As shown in Table 4 , the results indicated a small, significant, indirect effect of perceived reality B ϭ 0.047, so that the total effect of age on word comprehension B ϭ 0.339, was slightly reduced to B ϭ 0.292.
Discussion
Younger children, relative to older children, showed more belief in character and fantasy reality and more rejection of Chinese and Spanish words as "just pretend." These age differences were not explained by prior exposure to the shows or by the child's ethnicity. Although Hispanic and Chinese American children were more likely to know the meaning of the Spanish and Chinese words (respectively), they were no more likely to say that these words were real. Reality judgments appeared to have implications for learning-age differences in comprehension of Spanish and Chinese words were partially mediated by judgments that these words were real.
Study 2
In Study 2, we focused on the same core questions as in Study 1: the trajectory of age differences in reality judgments, possible explanations of those age differences, and the implications of reality judgments for learning. We sought to replicate the age differences in reality judgments observed in Study 1, but we also asked about the reality of both English and non-English words, and observed whether children responded to characters' queries. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
We modified our strategies for testing explanations of age differences. We examined the effects of familiarity with the depicted group by focusing on interpersonal contact rather than comparing children of different ethnicities. We assessed familiarity with TV and with the specific programs via parents' reports rather than relying on children's reports. We considered cognitive explanations for age differences, adding a measure of cognitive flexibility and coding children's open-ended responses for arguments or evidence and skepticism based on unfamiliarity.
Finally, we assessed a wider range of learning outcomes, examining children's learning not only of word meaning but also of information about holiday traditions of each group.
Method
Participants. A total of 115 children ages 3-5 participated. There were 64 boys (56%) and 51 girls (44%). Parent reports indicated that 105 were Anglo American (91%), five were biracial African American/Anglo (4%), three had families from India, and two had families from South Korea. For all children, English was the primary language at home. Non-Anglo and multiracial children were not outliers on any outcomes, so they were included in the analyses.
Design and procedure. Children were randomly assigned to watch either Dora the Explorer or Ni Hao, Kai Lan. After answering questions about the clips they had seen, children answered a subset of the knowledge questions for the other program, so that those who watched Dora served as a control group for those who watched Kai Lan, and vice versa. The session took roughly half an hour.
Materials. The Dora the Explorer clips included a segment about Dora visiting her grandmother to get a puppy (3 min 26 s) and one about Three Kings' Day (3 min 48 s). The Ni Hao, Kai Lan clips included a segment about a camp-out (3 min 6 s) and one about Chinese New Year (3 min 48 s).
Measures. Questions assessing comprehension of a given set of content were followed by questions asking about the reality of that content. Children were assured that they could say "not sure" to any question. To minimize some children's tendency to choose "not sure" to all reality questions, the options on the screen were This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
"yes" (green check, scored as 1) and "no" (red X, scored as Ϫ1).
Responses of "not sure" were scored as 0. Order of response options was counterbalanced. Word knowledge. Children chose which of three pictures showed the meaning of three non-English and two English words or phrases used repeatedly in the clips (from Dora: Abuela (grandma), perrito (puppy), Vámonos (let's go), candy, and skunk; from Kai Lan: Yeye (grandpa), toshye (slippers), gang wo lai (let's go), fruit, and tent). Children in both conditions were asked all questions, so that they would act as control group for the other. Scores for each language were averaged and could range from 0 to 1.
Reality of Spanish/Chinese and English. The interviewer read
Let's say a little kid is confused about these words. She [he] doesn't know whether X is a real word. Outside of TV, are there real people The question was asked for two non-English and two English words. The interviewer also asked all children, "Sometimes Kai Lan/Dora says she's speaking Chinese/Spanish. Outside of TV, do real people speak Chinese/Spanish?" The four non-English items (two word and two language judgments) were averaged as were the two English items; scores for each could range from Ϫ1 to 1. (In Table 2 Tradition reality. Children were asked (a) whether X "is a real special day that people really have outside of TV" (Three Kings' Day or Chinese New Year), (b) whether real people outside of TV eat X ("cake with a special thing hidden in it" or "special dumplings"), and (c) whether real people outside of TV get X ("toys and cake" or "red envelopes with money"). The three items were averaged; scores could range from Ϫ1 to 1.
Justifications for cultural reality judgments. Reality questions were followed by the question "Why do you think that?" Responses were coded (0 or 1) for rejection based on unfamiliarity (e.g., "I've never seen any dumplings") and (0 or 1) for arguments or evidence used to justify acceptance. The latter could be inaccurate so long as the principle was relevant (e.g., "Chinese is real because they speak it in India"). Irrelevant claims (e.g., "Because it makes me happy") or restatements of belief ("I just think so") were scored as zero. Krippendorff's alpha was above .80 for all coding. Scores could range from 0 to 1 for English, Chinese, Spanish, and tradition-reality evidence.
Character reality. The two items used in Study 1 were used, together with a third: "If we could open the TV or computer while [name of show] is on, could we touch her, inside there?" The three items were averaged. Unfortunately, justifications for these questions were too ambiguous to code reliably for principled arguments or evidence.
Fantasy reality. Children were asked about the talking animals (e.g., "Hoho the monkey talks to Kai Lan. Outside of TV, do real monkeys talk to kids like that?") We did not use their justifications in analyses, because most children (appropriately) supported "no" answers simply by restating that animals do not use words. It is unclear what could count as further evidence.
Perceived purpose of the program. Based on the work of Wright et al. (1994) , children were asked, "Is [name of show] just for fun (0), a mix of fun and learning (1), or just for learning (2)?"
Responses to character. The interviewer noted whether the child responded to the character's prompts: no response (0), pointing or nodding (1), or verbal response (2).
Cognitive flexibility. We used the card-sorting task of Lam et al. (2011) . Children were asked to sort eight cards depicting different shapes (circle or square), shape color (black or white), and pattern (zig-zag or dotted) in two different ways. Scores could range from 0 to 2.
Contact with Hispanic or Chinese individuals. Parents rated how often their child interacted with (a) children and (b) adults who were Latino/Hispanic/Chicano or Chinese/Chinese American on a scale ranging from (1) never to (5) very often. Child and adult items were averaged for each group (e.g., Hispanics for those who saw Dora the Explorer); scores could range from 1 to 5.
Media use and prior exposure to the programs. Parents reported how much time their child spent watching TV, DVDs, and videos on a typical week day and weekend day. They also rated how often their child watched the shows listed in Study 1 on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (very often).
Results
Correlations between reality judgments. Table 1 shows the correlations between the various reality measures. As in Study 1, character-and fantasy-reality judgments were positively correlated and were weakly negatively (intermittently significantly) associated with word-and tradition-reality judgments. Word and tradition reality were positively correlated. Perceived educational intent was not correlated with realism judgments but was positively correlated with responding to the character.
Perceived reality of English versus Chinese or Spanish words. To examine whether children dismissed the reality of English words as well as non-English words (a question left unanswered in Study 1), we performed a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on word-reality judgments (for comparability, we excluded items about the reality of Spanish and Chinese as languages), controlling for comprehension of the words. The results indicated significantly higher reality ratings for English (M ϭ .486, SE ϭ .058) versus non-English words (M ϭ .056, SE ϭ .074), Wilks ϭ .77, F(1, 109) ϭ 32.44, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .23. There was also a significant main effect of age, F(2, 109) ϭ 27.27, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .33, but no interaction with age. Three-year-olds were more skeptical of English and non-English words spoken by the character than 4-and 5-year-olds (see Table  3 ). Finally, there was a significant interaction between repeatedmeasure (English vs. non-English) and experimental condition (i.e., the non-English language being referenced) Wilks ϭ .96, F(1, 108) ϭ 4.73, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .04. Reality ratings of English words did not differ by program, but ratings for Spanish words from Dora clips (M ϭ .23, SE ϭ .11) were higher than ratings for Chinese words from Kai Lan clips (M ϭ -.13, SE ϭ .10).
Predicting reality judgments. We used a series of regression analyses to examine predictors of children's reality-related judgments and behaviors (see Table 5 ). The core question was whether there would be evidence of developmental differences. On Step 1, we entered experimental condition, prior exposure to the depicted group, the specific program, and TV/video in general. On
Step 2, we entered cognitive flexibility scores and, for wordand tradition-reality outcomes, children's use of evidence to justify their judgments. There were too few explicit appeals to unfamiliarity (only eight in the data set) to use as a predictor. Age was entered on Step 3.
As shown in Table 5 , age was significantly negatively associated with character-and fantasy-reality judgments; cognitive flexThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
ibility was not a significant predictor. Both cognitive flexibility and the use of evidence or arguments were positively associated with perceived reality of the depicted traditions, the English words used, and the non-English words or languages used. However, age was still a significant positive predictor beyond these effects. There were no significant age differences in perceptions that the show was meant for learning rather than fun or in rates of responding to the characters. Overall, the age patterns observed in Study 1 were replicated in Study 2, as was the lack of significant effects of prior exposure and contact. Table 3 shows the age distributions of responses to reality questions. The surprisingly high number of 3-year-olds who denied the reality of familiar English words (41%) raised the possibility that the age differences in reality judgments arose from a subset of 3-year-olds who misunderstood the questions. To examine this possibility, we again performed the previous regression analyses, entering children's scores on the English reality items on the first step together with the other covariates. The results indicated that cognitive flexibility, use of evidence, and age remained significant predictors of other reality judgments. Thus, it did not appear that the developmental differences were driven by basic confusion about the task.
We then conducted analyses of multiple mediation (see lower half of Table 4 ) examining whether cognitive flexibility and use of evidence mediated age differences in perceived reality of words and traditions. We conducted the analyses using age in months as the focal predictor and then again using age in years. The same variables were significant in both versions. To create consistency across all the mediation analyses (i.e., Study 1 and Study 2), and because unstandardized coefficients for age in months looked tiny given the age range and the 3-point scale (from Ϫ1 to 1) for outcomes, we present the analyses with age in years as the focal predictor.
For reality of English words, both cognitive flexibility and the use of evidence were significant mediators, so that the total effect of age on English word reality B ϭ 0.533 was reduced to 0.425. For non-English word or language reality, neither was a significant predictor. However, examination of children's open-ended responses showed that many more children provided evidence about Spanish being a real language than did so for Chinese. When we examined judgments about Spanish separately, children's use of evidence (but not flexibility) was a significant mediator, so that the total effect of age on Spanish language reality B ϭ 0.447 was slightly reduced to B ϭ 0.336. For tradition reality, use of evidence (but not flexibility) was a significant mediator, so that the total effect of age on tradition reality shrank from B ϭ 0.366 to B ϭ 0.245. Overall, there was some limited support for the predictions that ability to use evidence (and, to a lesser extent, cognitive flexibility) contribute to age differences in reality judgments.
Learning of traditions and words. There were four learning outcomes: knowledge of Three Kings' Day traditions, Chinese New Year traditions, Spanish words, Chinese words. We performed four hierarchical regression analyses, summarized in Table  6 . Experimental exposure to the TV clips predicted knowledge of both sets of traditions and knowledge of Chinese words but did not predict knowledge of the Spanish words, which was, instead, predicted by prior exposure to Dora the Explorer. This makes some sense given the considerable popularity of Dora the Explorer and the cross-episode repetition of key words. Prior exposure to Dora also predicted knowledge of Three Kings' Day traditions. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Overall, the findings suggest that children learn some content from exposure. Age also positively predicted all four learning outcomes. We then examined whether age interacted with experimental or habitual exposure to predict learning. There were no significant interactions. Reality judgments and learning. The next question was whether reality judgments would mediate age differences in learning (see Table 4 ). Consistent with Study 1, analysis of non-English word learning indicated a small, significant indirect effect of age (in years) via word or language reality, such that the total effect of age on non-English word learning B ϭ 0.149 was slightly reduced to B ϭ 0.109. There was no such mediation of comprehension of English words. For learning of traditions, perceived reality did not quite reach significance as a mediator.
We then examined, post hoc, whether other reality variables (fantasy reality, character reality, perceived goal of show, interaction with character) mediated the relationships between age and learning. Word learning (whether English or non-English) was not mediated by any of these other judgments. However, the results for tradition learning indicated a small, significant indirect effect of age via fantasy reality (while also including tradition reality as an additional mediator): younger children rated fantasy reality higher, and fantasy reality negatively predicted tradition learning. Thus, the total effect of age on learning about traditions, B ϭ 0.309, was reduced to 0.194. Neither interactivity nor perceived intent of the show predicted learning.
Discussion
As in Study 1, children's reality judgments became more accurate with age. Age differences in perceived reality of the educational content were partially mediated by the use of evidence to justify judgments and by cognitive flexibility. As in Study 1, reality judgments had implications for children's acquisition of information from the programs, providing partial mediation of age differences in learning of depicted words and traditions.
General Discussion
In their recent review, Woolley and Ghossainy (2013) wrote that young children face the developmental task of "finding a balance between acceptance and doubt" (p. 2). We examined 3-to 5-yearolds' attempts to strike this balance in their interpretations of educational TV depictions of Hispanic and Chinese culture. We focused on age differences in reality judgments, explanations for those age differences, and the implications for learning. Woolley and Ghossainy (2013) noted that there are competing hypotheses about the developmental progression of reality judgments. By some accounts, children move from initial credulity toward greater skepticism (e.g., Jaglom & Gardner, 1981) , but Woolley and Ghossainy argued that the weight of recent evidence suggests the opposite. In the current studies, it was not that children moved consistently from skepticism to belief, or the reverse. Rather, in both studies, older children made more accurate judgments than younger children, expressing less belief in character and fantasy reality and greater acceptance of the reality of the educational content.
It is also worth noting that age differences did not reflect a developmental shift from uncertainty to certainty (or the reverse).
As Table 2 indicates, 3-year-olds mostly said that the non-English words and depicted traditions were not real rather than saying that they were not sure. Indeed, their comments were often adamant ("There's no such thing as Three Kings' Day, and that's not special in the world"; "Nobody ever celebrates it"; "No one has presents in cakes"). Their judgments about character and fantasy reality were also divided between "yes" and "no" responses, rather than reflecting a preponderance of "not sure." Only when deciding on the reality of English words did they indicate uncertainty. The 4-and 5-year-olds similarly avoided "not sure" though they made different choices than the 3-year-olds.
What might explain the polarization within age groups? One possibility to be investigated in future studies is fantasy orientation, an individual difference variable reflecting a tendency toward pretend play and imaginary friends (Taylor, 1999) . Sharon and Woolley (2004) found that children with high fantasy orientation more accurately categorized entities (e.g., monsters, Michael Jordan) as real or pretend. They suggested that such children may spend more time thinking about these distinctions, or their parents may be more likely to explicitly discuss them. Fantasy orientation did not vary with age in Sharon and Woolley's study, so it is unlikely to explain away age differences in reality judgments, but it is possible that it would help explain the divided responses within age groups observed in both the current studies.
The significant age differences did not mean that 5-year-olds had fully mature judgments. Over a quarter of the children in both studies endorsed character-reality items (e.g., "Dora can hear me") and rejected the reality of the Spanish or Chinese words used by the characters. Moreover, age was unrelated to perceived learning in Study 1 and perceived program goal in Study 2, suggesting that even the 5-year-olds' schemas of educational TV were underdeveloped.
What explains these age patterns? We considered two types of explanation-the amount of experience (with the TV content or with the depicted group) and cognitive development (cognitive flexibility, appeals to unfamiliarity to justify claims of unreality, or use of arguments and evidence to support claims that something was real).
Age differences in character-reality judgments were not explained by prior exposure to the programs seen in the study (Study 1, Study 2), by the child's ethnicity (Study 1), by amount of contact with the depicted group (Study 2), or by cognitive flexibility scores (Study 2). Moreover, children's character-reality judgments did not predict whether they responded to the characters' prompts. Thus, there was no compelling counterevidence to Flavell et al.'s (1990) argument that 3-year-olds may often be reasoning about the characteristics of real people rather than genuinely believing that the character has ongoing life behind the screen.
Fantasy-reality judgments were correlated with character-reality judgments, and they showed similar declines with age. These age differences in perceived reality of talking backpacks, talking animals, and flying shoes were not explained by prior exposure to programming, overall TV viewing, amount of interpersonal experience with the depicted group, or cognitive flexibility. A few children said their parents had told them that a particular thing was not real, but otherwise, these judgments appeared to reflect knowledge and skills not captured by our measures. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
We did find partial explanation of age differences for judgments about the realism of the educational content. Consistent with prior research, neither prior viewing (Wright et al., 1994) nor prior contact with the depicted group (Greenberg & Reeves, 1976; Wright et al., 1995) predicted reality judgments for traditions or language. However, although these past experiences did not, in themselves, predict accuracy, the tendency to use those experiences as evidence did predict accuracy and did help explain age differences. With regard to the depicted traditions, older children were more likely to refer to past experiences as evidence and were in turn more likely to accept the reality of the traditions, rather than dismissing them as pretend. The same pattern emerged for judgments about the reality of Spanish words or language, but not for Chinese, where few children referenced personal experience. These indirect paths were significant even while we simultaneously examined the effects of cognitive flexibility, suggesting that the ability to articulate experience-based evidence is not simply an indicator of general cognitive development.
Failure to use evidence also provided some explanation for the puzzling tendency of 3-year-olds to say that familiar English words used by characters were not real. Older children were more likely to refer to experience (e.g., "One time when we were driving home, my mom and me and sister smelled a skunk") or to point out that they and others used the word, and this type of reasoning, together with cognitive flexibility scores, helped predict reality judgments.
The tendency not to use experience as evidence even for familiar words was noteworthy in conjunction with the finding that children did not generally appeal to unfamiliarity to justify skepticism. Woolley and Ghossainy (2013) suggested that younger children may be skeptical because they overestimate the diagnostic value of unfamiliarity for reality. Although there were some instances in our studies where children explicitly rejected reality based on lack of personal experience (e.g., not real because . . . "I haven't seen anyone eat dumplings," . . . "I don't see them do it," or . . . "I didn't have Three Kings' Day before"), there were too few such examples to mediate age differences in reality judgments. The lack of such appeals may partly reflect the fact that the youngest children were the least verbal and often said nothing at all. However, it may also be that younger children's skepticism was not based on unfamiliarity (consistent with the lack of effects of contact and prior exposure) but rather on a disregard for familiarity that would constitute evidence of reality.
Obviously, this argument requires further examination, a task that is hampered by the difficulty of eliciting verbal responses from very young participants. However, this possible explanation is consistent with prior findings that younger children (relative to older children) were less influenced by experimental exposure to relevant evidence (Tullos & Woolley, 2009; Woolley, Boerger, & Markman, 2004) . Woolley and Ghossainy (2013) noted that modifying skepticism on the basis of evidence is effortful. In the case of word judgments, perhaps young children, having dismissed the reality of non-English words, overextended that classification to English words as well and were unable to use their knowledge of the words to override this categorization.
Despite these suggestive indirect paths, the findings about language remain in need of replication and extension. It is unclear whether children would dismiss English words in programs with no foreign words and whether such judgments reflect quarantining particular to television (perhaps as an ongoing legacy of the video deficit) or would occur even for words presented in stories or conversation about these media figures. Moreover, presumably children would not refuse to eat candy or talk about skunks in the future, having heard these words spoken by Dora or Kai Lan. Work is needed to examine how reality judgments predict use of televised content in other contexts, both for words and for the other educational content.
This brings us to our final research question, which focused on the implications of reality judgments for children's learning. Age was positively associated with learning outcomes in both Study 1 and Study 2, indicating that within the target age range of the programs, older children were learning more from viewing. The question was whether that was in part attributable to their greater ability to assess the reality of the educational and fantasy content. Huston et al. (1997) hypothesized that dismissing content as unrealistic might depress children's learning by reducing their attention or subsequent rehearsal of the content. In both Study 1 and Study 2, age differences in Chinese and Spanish word learning were partially mediated by perceived reality of the words and language-older children were more likely to say that they were real, and perceived reality predicted more comprehension. In Study 2, where we assessed children's learning of holiday traditions, perceived reality of the traditions was not a significant mediator. However, post hoc, we found that age differences in learning of holiday traditions were significantly mediated by fantasy reality judgments. Younger children, relative to older children, were more likely to say that talking animals were real, and such judgments were negatively associated with learning about the traditions. This finding obviously needs replication and extension, particularly given that we only had a single-item measure of fantasy reality in Study 2. However, it fits with models of educational media processing (e.g., Fisch, 2000) that cognitive resources for processing the educational content may be depleted by focusing on the fantasy content, which forms part of the narrative but is not informative.
It was also noteworthy what did not mediate age differences in learning. We had speculated that believing in the reality of the character might increase responding to the character's prompts, which might, in turn, increase learning. In fact, character-reality judgments were unrelated to amount of responding, and neither character-reality beliefs nor interactivity mediated (or suppressed) age differences in learning outcomes. The lack of effects of interaction with the character is in contrast to Calvert et al.'s (2007) findings (also with Dora the Explorer) and suggests the need to consider what types of interactions facilitate comprehension.
There were multiple limitations to the current studies and numerous puzzles raised. Despite our efforts in Study 1, we failed to recruit adequate numbers of non-Anglo children, so that the generalizability of the reality and learning outcomes remains an important question. Relatedly, it may be that frequency of contact with ethnic outgroups is less relevant to reality judgments than depth of contact with even a single exemplar and the extent to which experiences resonate with the depicted material. Examining children's beliefs about target ethnicities prior to viewing would improve our understanding of the degree to which media depictions act upon those beliefs and the context in which specific types of content are rejected. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Our failure to find effects of fantasy versus family focus in Study 1 may reflect the lack of a completely clean manipulation. However, it is also possible that the skepticism even in the lowfantasy condition reflected the ongoing legacy of the video deficit and that the absence of fantasy cues would not be enough to override this predisposition. Further work with stronger manipulations is needed to examine this issue, with a broader range of learning outcomes. Do young viewers express similar disbelief about science, math, and other standard curricula, with or without fantasy cues, or are they particularly dubious about depictions of culture and language? What would it take to signal the reality and intended purpose of educational content, and what would the implications be for interest and pleasure in viewing? The challenges and hazards of signaling educational intent are suggested by a study by Krcmar and Albada (2000) with 5-to 11-year-olds. Recall was unaffected by labeling the content as educational, but attraction and attention varied by age, gender, and labeling strategy. We are currently examining the effects of such labeling on preschoolers' reality judgments and learning.
Despite the many limitations, the studies are a first step toward bridging the gap between research on the video deficit (conducted with children younger than age 3), and research on TV reality judgments (conducted with children age 5 and older). In Study 2, we also linked TV reality research with the fantasyreality literature, testing and finding some support for cognitive explanations of children's reality judgments, in the context of educational television. Finally, these studies are the first to examine the implications of preschoolers' reality judgments for their learning.
We began this article by asking what, if anything, audience members might conclude about Hispanics and other depicted groups from watching programs such as Dora the Explorer and Ni Hao, Kai Lan. The findings here suggest that children's ensuing beliefs about the world around them are a complicated blend, reflecting some knowledge gain and some confusion. Examining children's responses to educational TV programming potentially offers paths toward making such content more effective but also adds to the literature on children's developing theories about how to distinguish useful, factual information from peripheral entertainment.
